The S-300P surface-to-air missile system—currently manufactured, deployed, and exported by the Russians—is designed to detect, track, and destroy incoming ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and low-flying aircraft. Also known by its NATO designation, SA-10 Grumble, the system has been modified several times since its inception: the most recent variants are the S-300PMU-1 (SA-10D) and the S-300PMU-2 (SA-10E Favorit).
In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union began work on a new strategic air defense system known as the S-300 (NATO: SA-10 Grumble). The S-300 was designed by the Russian Almaz Scientific Production Association to shoot down low-altitude targets, including cruise missiles and aircraft.(1) From the beginning, the system included the most “cutting-edge” Soviet missile defense technology. Its phased-array fire control radar was capable of tracking up to six targets simultaneously, while its single-state, solid-fuel propelled missile sported aerodynamic control surfaces and thrust vectoring. The first S-300 missile, known as 5V55K, had a range of 47 kilometers and could engage its targets between 100 and 30,000 meters.(2)
In 1980, the S-300 became operational and was renamed S-300P, in order to distinguish it from the S-300V (NATO: SA-12A Gladiator; SA-12B Giant), another surface-to-air missile system deployed by Soviet ground forces. The “P” in S-300P stood for “PVO-Strany,” code for “air defense system,” while the “V” in S-300V was for “Voyska,” or “ground forces.” Although some of the technology was similar, the two systems were quite different: the S-300P was designed to engage cruise missiles and other low-flying targets; the S-300V was developed to shoot down tactical ballistic missiles.(3) By 1987, approximately 80 S-300P sites were operational, with another 20 in the making. Nearly half were located around Moscow to protect key military and industrial complexes.(4) Over the years, the S-300P has undergone several modifications, including the S-300PT (SA-10A), the S-300PT-1/1A (also SA-10A), the S-300PS (SA-10B), and the S-300PM (SA-10C).(5)
Although the Soviet Union imploded in 1991, the Russians continued upgrading and modifying the S-300P system throughout the 1990s. At the 1992 Moscow Air Show, the Russians displayed the latest version in the S-300P lineage, the S-300PMU-1 (SA-10D). This upgraded system, armed with new single-stage, solid-fuel propelled 48N6 missiles, has the capability to shoot down tactical ballistic missiles in addition to cruise missiles and aircraft, at ranges of 5-150 kilometers and altitudes between 10-27,000 meters. The 1,900 kilogram missile carries a 143 kilogram high-explosive fragmentation warhead. A typical S-300PMU-1 battery contains 48 missiles on 12 mobile launchers. Each battery is capable of launching one 48N6 missile every three seconds. The missiles are guided by the 36N85 vehicle-mounted engagement radar, which is capable of detecting incoming ballistic missiles at 40 kilometers, and aircraft between 3 and 150 kilometers. The 36N85 can guide up to twelve 48N6 missiles, while simultaneously tracking up to six targets.(6)
In 1997, the Russians unveiled yet another variant of the system, this time called S-300PMU-2 (SA-10E Favorit). Its larger missiles (9M96E and 9M96E2), longer range (200 kilometers), and better guidance system make the S-300PMU-2 a thorough modification of its predecessor. The system can engage targets between 10 meters and 27 kilometers above the ground.(7) The Russians claim that, during a series of tests in the mid-1990s, the S-300PMU-2 shot down a target ballistic missile traveling at 1,600 meters per second, and that the system can destroy targets traveling at 4,800 meters per second.(8) The Russians add that the system has a kill ratio between 0.8 and 0.98 against Tomahawk-class cruise missiles and from 0.8 to 0.93 against aircraft.(9)
One of the main reasons why the Russians devoted so much time and effort to upgrading and modifying the S-300P during the 1990s was to increase the system’s market value. In a trend that continues to cause much concern in the U.S., the Russians have been exporting S-300P missiles (and other weapons) throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East as a means of financing their ailing economy.
In 1991, the same year as the Soviet collapse, Syria announced its intention to purchase $1.5 billion worth of arms from the Russians, including an unidentified number of S-300P missiles.(10) The following year, China began negotiating its own deal, and in 1993 received “dozens” of Russian S-300Ps, heightening U.S. concerns over the surge in weapons proliferation. In particular, the U.S was worried (and still is) that China would dismantle the Russian S-300s and incorporate the advanced technology into its own offensive missiles, such as the CSS-6 (DF-15/M-9) and the CSS-7 (DF-11/M-11), which in turn would be proliferated on down the line.(11)
In 1993, Iran procured an unidentified number of S-300PMU-1 missiles from Russia. Kuwait expressed its own interest shortly afterward.(12) According to a 1993 report, “the S-300PMU is being marketed extensively, particularly in the Middle East.”(13) The following year, Hungary received its own supply of Russian S-300s: the deal paid off Russia’s $800 million debt to its former Warsaw Pact ally.(14) In November 1996, Mikhail Timkin, deputy manager of the Rosvooruzheniye state arms export company, bragged that he had found two more buyers for the S-300P: “Cyprus is in the bag, we’ve wrapped it up completely. It buys only our weapons now. We have even got into NATO, can you imagine? I am in charge of Turkey, and I can tell you that Turkey is now buying weapons from us.”(15) A few years later, Greece was added to the list.(16)
As late as August 2002, Iraq was attempting to acquire its own S-300 missiles, possibly as a means of frustrating or delaying an attack by the U.S. Sources indicate that Saddam Hussein was trying to acquire enough S-300 components from Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine to build his own missile defense shield.(17) Iraq never completed this objective, although in April 2003 Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov admitted that Operation Iraqi Freedom had caused an upsurge in purchases of Russian weapons from other Middle Eastern nations: “We got a great advertising gift for our weapons in Iraq.” During the war, Alexander Nozdrachev, head of the state-run Russian Agency for Conventional Weapons, correctly predicted that the Iraq conflict would “generate a surge in interest in anti-aircraft defenses.” That year alone, Russian arms sales totaled $4.5 billion, mostly to Syria, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia—the lion’s share of which was for missile defense systems such as the S-300.